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Abstract
Do reduced costs of factor mobility mitigate ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms, to the extent that they are 
reversed? The case of federations provides an indication they do. By investigating 'Resource Curse' 
effects in all federations with available state-level data, it is observed that within federations 
resource abundance is a blessing, while between federations it is a curse, similar to results observed 
in previous cross-country studies. A theory is then presented in an attempt to explain the opposite 
results of the intra and cross federal (and previous cross-country) analyses. It is argued that the 
reduced costs of factor mobility within federations trigger an ‘Alberta Effect’ –where resource 
abundant regions exploit the fiscal advantage, provided by resource rents, to compete more 
aggressively in the inter-regional competition over capital, and as a result attract vast amounts of 
capital– which in turn mitigates, and even reverses, ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms, so that ‘Resource 
Curse’ effects do not apply. Thus, this paper emphasizes the significance of the mitigating role of 
factor mobility in 'Dutch Disease' theory, and presents a novel mechanism (the ‘Alberta Effect’)
through which this mitigation, and possible reversion, process occurs. The paper concludes with 
empirical evidence for the main implications of the model, taking the United States as a case study. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Can reduced costs of factor mobility mitigate 'Dutch Disease' symptoms, to the extent that they are 
reversed? Classic 'Dutch Disease' theory overlooks this potentially critical point.1 Corden (1984) 
briefly considers the mitigation effects of immigration; more recently Wahba (1998) and 
Vermeulen (2010) do so formally. These papers, however, point at the increased marginal 
productivities, in the form of higher wages, as the triggering mechanism, which can at best 
mitigate the 'Dutch Disease' effects. Through the case of federations, this paper demonstrates that 
reduced costs of factor mobility not only mitigate 'Dutch Disease' effects but can in fact reverse 
them, and presents a novel mechanism (the 'Alberta Effect') through which this mitigation, and 
possible reversion, process occurs.
In an influential set of papers, Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, 1999, 2001) presented the 
so-called growth curse of natural resources, showing a counterintuitive negative relationship 
between resource abundance and economic growth.2 Albeit facing criticism (Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte 2007), several additional empirical studies further confirmed this finding;3 however, the vast 
majority of them (Sachs and Warner's included) investigated cross-country variations, thus 
questioning its robustness for variations in more local settings. Indeed, historical accounts, such as 
the famous 19th century California gold rush,4 show that resource abundance can be a blessing at 
the local level; recent studies support this story as well.5
We start with a further investigation of this insight by looking into the case of federations, 
which is particularly interesting in our context as it lets us focus specifically on the effects of 
                                                  
1 See Corden and Neary 1982, Krugman 1987, van Wijnbergen 1984. Considering a resource boom (being the 
focus of this paper), 'Dutch Disease' is divided to a 'spending effect' and a 'resource movement effect'. The former
describes the inflationary outcome of an income shock which, in turn, causes an appreciation of the local 
currency, while the latter describes the movement of production factors from various sectors to the resource one
due to higher marginal productivities. The main idea is that both effects cause tradable sectors (specifically, 
manufacturing) to contract. However, this literature does not consider the impact of mobility costs on these 
effects, as they assume capital is immobile and labor supply is fixed. This paper aims to demonstrate that 
considering mobility costs may be critical to the extent that results change dramatically.
2 It should nevertheless be noted that concerns over specialization on natural resource exports have been raised 
previously by Raol Prebisch and Hans Singer more than half a century ago; however, these were not discussed in 
a similar context to the recent ‘Resource Curse’ literature.
3 See Auty, 2001, Gylfason 2000, 2001, Gylfason et al. 1999, Lane and Tornell 1996, Leite and Weidmann 1999, 
Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004, Rodriquez and Sachs 1999.
4 Discovery of gold caused mass population movement to the west of the United States which had an immense 
positive effect on the development of the area. Other gold rushes, such as 19th century gold rushes in Canada, 
South Africa, and Australia, present similar stories 
5 Aragon and Rud (2009) show how a Peruvian goldmine increase welfare at the localized level, Michaels (2007) 
shows how resource abundance levers development in the long run at the county level (investigating regions in 
southern United States), and lastly, Michaels and Caselli (2009) show how 'Dutch Disease' does not apply in
Brazilian municipalities.
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reduced mobility costs on 'Dutch Disease' symptoms.  On one hand federal-states are comparable 
to sovereign countries in terms of determination of fiscal policy, resource ownership, availability 
of data, variability in institutional quality, and price level differentials,6 yet on the other hand since 
it is less costly to relocate physical capital or labor within a federation than across countries they 
present an environment with reduced mobility costs. Thus, this makes it convenient to compare an 
intra-federal analysis to a cross-federal one (as well as to previous cross-country ones, in the spirit 
of Sachs and Warner), and attribute any differences in outcomes to differences in the costs of 
factor mobility. That being said, we consider all federal-states that have available data,7 and 
undertake both cross-sectional and panel analyses to re-examine Sachs and Warner's hypothesis 
within and between federations.8 Results show that resource abundance is a blessing at the federal-
state level, yet similar to the previous cross-country studies remains a curse at the federal level. 
These opposite, yet significant, results are robust to holding standard growth-explaining variables 
constant, as well as to different resource abundance measures and estimation methods.  
By extending Zodrow and Mieszkowski's (1986) basic capital tax competition model,9 a 
theory is presented in an attempt to explain these different outcomes. Motivated by the case of 
Alberta and focused on the 'resource movement effect',10 the model analyzes a simple two-region
capital tax competition, and shows that with sufficiently low mobility costs a resource boom 
triggers an 'Alberta Effect'11 –where resource abundant states exploit the fiscal advantage, 
provided by the resource rents, to compete more aggressively in the inter-regional competition 
over capital, and as a result attract vast amounts of capital– which in turn mitigates, and even 
reverses, 'Dutch Disease' symptoms (and, following Wahba's (1998) theory, transmits them to 
factor exporting regions) so that eventually 'Resource Blessing' effects are observed within 
                                                  
6 See Section 3 for an elaborated discussion.
7 Namely, 247 federal states of: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Malaysia, Russia, United 
Arab Emirates, and the United States. 
8 Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) checked for 'Resource Curse' effects within the United States and found they 
apply. However, they investigated the period of 1986-2000 and dropped Delaware and the District of Columbia 
from their sample. Albeit testing a similar hypothesis, in this paper the general sample is not limited to the United 
States (includes nine additional federations), and in addition the specific sample on the United States includes 
Delaware and the District of Columbia and investigates an extended period (1977-2008). As will be evident, 
results change as a result.  
9 The model considers an endowment asymmetry framework, which has not been analyzed previously in tax 
competition models. This will be discussed in greater detail in Section 4.
10 See Sections 3 and 4 for elaborated discussions. 
11 This mechanism was initially presented by Helliwell (1981). Corden (1984) further discussed it in the context 
of the ‘Dutch Disease’, describing how Alberta successfully attracted factors of production by following it; he 
referred to it as the ‘Alberta Effect’. In this paper we adopt this definition, and argue its mechanics are amplified 
and emphasized in an environment with reduced mobility costs (such as federations, or other localized settings 
with sufficient fiscal autonomy). 
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federations. In effect, similar to sovereign countries resource abundant federal-states suffer from 
'Dutch Disease' symptoms; however, in contrast to sovereign countries they operate in an 
environment with reduced mobility costs which enables them to initiate an 'Alberta Effect' and 
consequently attract the necessary capital so that their manufacturing sector does not contract, and 
even expand. The model shows there exists a threshold mobility level below which an ‘Alberta 
Effect’ is undertaken and above which it is not. In case it is assumed that within federations 
mobility costs are below that threshold while between countries they are above it, then this model 
provides an explanation for the difference in outcomes presented initially.  
We validate the suggested mechanism through an intra-federal analysis of the United 
States. The empirical investigation shows that resource abundant states present a more competitive 
business environment (in the form of more competitive taxes, greater investment in infrastructure, 
and greater public good provision), attract more physical capital as a result, and contrary to 
predictions of 'Dutch Disease' theory have their manufacturing sector grow faster in terms of both 
GDP and labor shares – as the model predicts.
The paper is structured as follows – Section 2 goes through the initial empirical exercise, 
investigating whether 'Resource Curse' occurs within and between federations. Section 3 discusses 
the results presented in Section 2 and explains the motivation for the model. Section 4 presents the 
model and goes through the theoretical analysis. Section 5 presents empirical evidence for the 
main implications of the model, through the case of the United States. Section 6 concludes.
2. INVESTIGATING 'RESOURCE CURSE' EFFECTS WITHIN AND BETWEEN FEDERATIONS
Out of the 25 recognized federations the minimum required state-level data is available for the 
following – Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Malaysia, Russia, United Arab 
Emirates, and United States. The sample used for each of the federations is the maximum 
available; complete description of the data, sources, and periods investigated for each federation, 
is presented in Appendix 1. As a first take we plot in Figure 1 the average annual real per capita
growth versus resource abundance at initial period – of federal-states (left figure) and of sovereign 
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countries (right figure).12 Additional graphs, for each of the federations separately as well as for 
the similar, though non-federal, cases of China, Spain and Europe, are presented in Appendix 2.13  
Sovereign Countries (Sachs and Warner, 1997)
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FIGURE 1. Resource-abundance and economic growth in federal states and sovereign countries
This preliminary comparison implies that ‘Resource Curse’ mechanics affect federal-states and 
sovereign countries differently, to the extent that opposite outcomes are observed; as will be 
evident, these opposite outcomes also apply when the comparison is made against the cross-
federal sample (instead of the one presented in the right figure) and in all cases are robust to 
holding standard growth-explaining variables constant, as well as to various resource abundance 
measures and different estimation techniques.    
In their work on the ‘Resource Curse’, Sachs and Warner (1997) applied a simple cross-
section methodology, regressing average annual real per capita growth on the logarithm of initial 
income, and a vector of standard growth-explaining controls that also includes a proxy for 
resource-share (all measured at initial year), to identify the phenomenon. We start by following 
their methodology, applied to the case of federations; this enables us, at least initially, to test our 
                                                  
12 The right figure is the original graph presented by Sachs and Warner (1997). As for the left figure, Russian 
states do not appear in the graph; results do not change in case they are included, but variability increases, 
making the graph less applicable. Also, the focus in this section is mainly on the comparison between the intra 
and cross federal scenarios, yet this initial comparison to sovereign countries in-general and to the previous 
seminal results of Sachs and Warner (1997) provides some intuition to what lies ahead. 
13 As was mentioned earlier, the case of federations is not restrictive; different regional settings (confederations 
like Europe or federations-de-facto like China and Spain) may be of interest to the given hypothesis. 
Nonetheless, these will not be part of the complete federations-sample, since the focus is on comparing federal-
states with other federal-states of equivalent status. Nonetheless, note that results do not change qualitatively in 
case Europe, China, and Spain are included in the general sample.
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results against theirs. Therefore, two samples are used; the first is a cross-section of 247 federal-
states, and the second is a five-year-average panel of the 10 federations to which the federal-states 
correspond;14 each sample covers the exact same time period for each corresponding federation.
We test the following model, for each of these two samples:15
ittitititit LUSAustraliaZRYG   1413432010 ...)ln(                    (1)
Let us keep in mind that throughout the following analyses our coefficient of interest is 2 ; 
mostly, we are interested in realizing its direction and significance.
Starting with the intra-federal sample, time effects are dropped due to the cross-sectional 
estimation. As for the explanatory variables – the resource-share proxy is the share of primary 
sector (agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining) in GDP;16 the proxy for human capital is the 
share of the education-industry in GDP, that for investment is the share of gross capital formation 
in GDP, for openness it is the net international migration rate, and finally for institutional quality it
is the share of the public administration sector in GDP. Note that the resource-share, human 
capital, investment, and openness proxies have been commonly used in previous studies;17 the 
latter one (namely, institutional quality) requires further elaboration. At the country level there are 
several objective institutional quality indices that incorporate various aspects of the complex 
nature of this measure, which thus make them potentially more accurate; however, no such
objective measure exists uniformly for all federal-states, whereas using each separately would 
significantly cut down the sample. The size of the public administration industry in GDP gives a 
unified objective measure across federal-states and between federations, and despite its imperfect 
                                                  
14 Panel estimation is used for the cross-federal sample due to the small sample size (10 federations); estimating a 
cross-sectional version of this sample do not change the direction of results, yet significance drops due to the 
limited sample size.
15 In terms of notation: ‘G’ is annualized average real per capita GDP growth,15 ‘ 0Y ’ is per capita real GDP in 
the initial year, ‘R’ is the proxy for resource-abundance in the initial year, ‘Z' is a vector of control variables that 
includes human capital, investment, institutional quality and openness all measured in initial year (to avoid 
possible endogeneity), ‘Australia’ through ‘US’ are dummy-variables for each of the 10 federations, L is a 
dummy for landlocked states, and  is a time effect. Note that since the period investigated for each federation is 
different, initial income is normalized for all federal-states; see Appendix 1 for treatment of initial income. 
16 Sachs and Warner's initial resource-share proxy involved share of primary exports in GDP; doing the same for 
the intra-federal sample would decrease the sample significantly (due to limitation in data availability on exports 
at the state-level); therefore, primary production share in GDP is used, similar to the proxy adopted by Papyrakis 
and Gerlagh (2007). Note that at the cross-country level the two proxies are highly correlated (0.74636).
17 See Sachs and Warner (1997) and Papayrakis and Gerlagh (2004), among others. More specifically, we realize 
the openness proxy is not obvious. A potentially more accurate proxy would involve some measure of exports 
and imports; however, this data is scarcely available at the federal-state level, and would have decreased our 
sample significantly. Therefore, we follow Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) and estimate this using the net 
international migration rate; following their justification, open economies tend be more welcoming to immigrants 
(Ethier 1985, Rodrik 1997).
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measure of institutional quality it was found to be a key determining factor of it.18 One concern is 
that federal districts, which are considered independent federal-subjects yet host most of the 
federal administrative units,19 may introduce biased measures due to their relatively high 
administrative share in GDP. However, when dropped from the sample results do not change in
direction or significance; thus, they are included in the analyses to follow.20 Results for this case 
are presented in Table 1; we start with having only the resource-share proxy in 'Z', and gradually 
increase it in the regressions that follow. We observe expected results on initial income, human 
capital, institutional quality, investment, and openness; while the first is constantly negative 
(providing evidence for convergence), the remaining ones are constantly positive, with varying 
significances, following results of previous growth studies.21 More importantly, however, our 
coefficient of interest ( 2 ) is positive and significant in all regressions, indicating 'Resource 
Blessing' effects at the federal-state level. 
For the cross-federal case, the resource-share proxy remains to be the share of primary sector 
in GDP; proxies for the remaining variables are as follows – for human capital: the average years 
of total schooling for population aged 15 and over (Barro and Lee 2010), for investment: share of 
gross investment in GDP (World Bank Development Indicators 2010), for openness: share of 
international trade in GDP (World Bank Development Indicators 2010), for institutional quality:
Political Rights Index (Freedom House 2008);22 all of which considered standard measures of 
these proxies in the growth literature. Results appear in Table 2. Again, we start with only having 
the resource-share proxy in 'Z', and then gradually increase it thereafter. As in the intra-federal 
scenario, here also we observe significant convergence ( 1 < 0), and positive effects, in varying 
significances, of human capital, institutional quality, investment, and openness. However, in 
contrast to the intra-federal analysis, in this case our coefficient of interest ( 2 ) is rather 
constantly negative and significant, indicating 'Resource Curse' effects at the federal level. 
The intra-federal 'Resource Blessing' result also stands in contrast to those of previous cross-
country studies of this phenomenon such as Sachs and Warner (1997), Gylfason (2001), and
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004), who investigate 'Resource Curse' effects in sovereign countries. 
                                                  
18 See La Porta et al. 1999, Annett 2001. 
19 These include District of Columbia (US), Federal District (Brazil), and the Capital Territory (Australia),  
20 Results with these federal district dropped are available from the author. 
21 For cross-country settings see Barro (1991) and Mankiw et al. (1992), among others. For intra-federal settings 
see Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007).
88
Despite undertaking a similar methodology, these previous seminal studies look into earlier 
periods than the one investigated in the intra-federal case. Given the sharp increase in oil prices 
during the past decade, one concern is that their results may change when tested under the period 
of the intra-federal sample, implying that the intra-federal 'Resource Blessing' effects may be
period-specific.23 To alleviate this concern, we extend Sachs and Warner's (1997b) exercise to the 
period tested under the intra-federal sample (1977-2008).24 Results appear in Table 3. Columns 
one through five present Sachs and Warner's (1997b) original results, 25 tested for the period 1965-
1990, while columns six through ten present those for the extended period of 1977-2008. Results 
remain similar in sign and significance in both cases;26 specifically, the coefficient of the resource-
share proxy remains negative and significant in the period of 1977-2008, as it is in the earlier one. 
Thus, this outcome, together with the cross-federal one (which also investigates the period of 
1977-2008), shows that the intra-federal result is, in fact, not period-specific; it remains to be 
opposite to the cross-federal and cross-country ones even when comparable periods are tested. 
Another concern is that the intra-federal results may suffer from a sample selection bias. The 
intra-federal sample includes all federal-states that have available data; however, this availability 
depends on the federal institutional quality, and is biased towards the relatively stronger ones (so 
that, for instance, data is available for the federal-states of the United States, yet not for those of 
Sudan). This implies that the intra-federal 'Resource Blessing' effects may in fact be driven by 
good institutions. To show this is not case, we divide the intra-federal sample to two groups; the 
first (Group 1) includes federal-states of the federations with stronger institutions while the second 
                                                                                                                                                               
22 The Political Rights Index measures the degree of freedom in the electoral process, political pluralism and 
participation, and functioning of government. Numerically, Freedom House rates political right on a scale of one 
to seven, with seven representing the most free and one representing the least free.
23 This concern remains valid despite showing that 'Resource Curse' effects do occur in the cross-federal case 
(that covers the same period as the intra-federal one), because these seminal results of the previous cross-country 
studies tend to be used as benchmark, and are often being compared to in other studies in this literature. 
24 An identical methodology is followed; additionally, variables are identical to the ones used in the cross-federal 
case. This is slightly different than Sachs and Warner's (1997) data, yet compares better with the initial intra and 
cross federal results. Note that a slight methodological difference between this and the cross as well as the intra 
federal analyses, is the exclusion of regional dummies; however, on one hand results do not change 
(qualitatively) when these are included, and on the other hand previous results on the intra and cross federal 
samples do not change (qualitatively) if these dummies are excluded from their analyses, making them equivalent 
to the current one. Results of either are not presented; however, they are available from the author. 
25 For variables used and sources, see Sachs and Warner (1997b). Variable names, as they appear in Sachs and 
Warner (1997b), are as follows – resource-share proxy: 'SXPR', human capital: 'SEC80', investment: 
'LINV7089', openness: 'OPEN6590', and institutional quality: 'ICRGE80'.
26 In both periods there is evidence for convergence, as well as for positive impact of human capital, investment, 
openness, and institutional quality on average annual real per capita growth.
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(Group 2) includes those of the federations with weaker ones.27 We follow the analysis made on 
the entire sample, and check for 'Resource Curse' effects in each of the divided sub-samples
separately. Results appear in Table 4. In both groups the coefficient on the resource-share proxy is 
positive; however, it is insignificant in Group 1, yet highly significant in Group 2 – in all 
regressions. This implies that 'Resource Blessing' effects amplify as the federal institutional
quality deteriorates; thus, if anything there is a downward sample selection bias, so that the true 
estimators are actually more positive than they already are.28 An intuitive explanation for this 
relates to federal equalization schemes, which are possibly more effective in regimes with stronger 
institutions. This, in turn, implies that in federations with stronger institutions resource rents are 
redistributed across the federation more effectively, so that intra-federal variability is lower 
compared to that of federations with weaker institutions. Greater intra-federal variability and less 
effective redistribution of resource rents favor resource abundant federal-states, which
consequently experience amplified 'Resource Blessing' effects, as the above result suggests.
Finally, following the criticism introduced by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2007) and Van der 
Ploeg (2010) the intra-federal results may suffer from both omitted variable bias, as well as 
enodgeneity bias (as the resource-share proxy may in fact be endogenous to the growth or income 
levels). To address the former we follow Caselli et al. (1996) and undertake an intra-federal 
analysis of equation (1) through panel estimation, with fixed effects.29 To address the latter we 
consider two additional resource-share measures – the first being mineral output as share of 
GDP,30 and the second land per capita.31 We argue that both serve as exogenous resource-share 
                                                  
27 Thus, the first group includes federal-states of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, and the United States, 
and the second group includes federal-states of Brazil, India, Malaysia, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(division was based on the institutional quality measure used in the cross-federal sample).
28 An alternative, and perhaps more formal, way for demonstrating the downward sample selection bias would 
have been to add to the complete sample a measure of federal institutional quality, and an interaction term of it 
with the resource-share proxy; however, given the federal dummies, such an exercise can not be undertaken. 
Nonetheless, we have taken a similar exercise where a new general measure, which is an interaction of the 
federal and state institutional qualities, was added together with its interaction with the resource-share proxy, and 
results (which are available from the author) confirm the above finding, as the coefficient on the interaction term 
is positive and significant, indicating that intra-federal 'Resource Blessing' effects increase as federal institutional 
quality decreases. 
29 The panel sample is identical to the cross-sectional one in terms of the variables used, yet extends it in terms of 
sample size as it divides the same time period (1977-2008) to sub-periods of five years. In addition, following 
Caselli et al. (1996), all variables in this sample are expressed as deviations from period means to account for 
time specific effects, and a first-difference is taken, to cancel the state-specific effects. Lastly, all variables are 
measured in initial year and are assumed to be pre-determined (to minimize endogeneity effects).  
30 This includes the share of oil, natural gas, and mining out of GDP. For sources (for both additional measures) 
for the intra-federal sample, see Appendix 1; for the cross-country sample all data was retrieved from the World 
Bank Development Indicators.
31 Following Sachs and Warner's (1997) methodology, we use the logarithm of this measure in the estimations.
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measures that can, therefore, replace the current proxy or otherwise instrument it. The first is such 
since on one hand mineral production is often lead by multinational firms that bring their own 
knowledge and technology, making it independent of a country's growth or income levels, while 
on the other hand it correlates highly with primary production, by definition. The second is such 
because on one hand during the period investigated the area of land is already pre-determined,32
making it exogenous, while on the other hand it correlates highly with primary output since higher 
land per capita provides greater potential for primary output. Table 5 presents results for the intra-
federal panel estimation; in columns one through five primary output is used as the resource-share
proxy, whereas in columns six through nine the two additional measures are used either as proxies 
in lieu of primary output or as instruments for it. In all regressions coefficients on the non-resource 
variables are kept similar to the previous ones in terms of sign, magnitude, and significance; more 
importantly, the main result of intra-federal 'Resource Blessing' effects remain to hold under high 
significance, with the exception of when land per capita is used (significance drops, yet sign is 
kept).33 In the relevant regressions, results of first-stage estimations indicate that both measures 
are well associated with primary output. To further confirm previous results using the two 
additional measures, we test them using the previous cross-sectional intra-federal and cross-
country samples.34 Results appear in Table 6; in columns one through four the two additional 
resource-share measures are tested on the cross-sectional intra-federal sample, whereas in columns 
five through eight they are tested on the cross-country sample, covering the period of 1977-2008. 
Results show that the intra-federal 'Resource Blessing' and cross-country 'Resource Curse' effects 
remain to hold using either of these measures (directly as a proxy in the regression or as an 
instrument for primary output),35 so that the opposite outcome of the two cases is maintained even 
when tested under these two additional measures. Once again, for the relevant regressions, first-
stage estimations indicate strong association between the two measures and primary output.  
                                                  
32 In addition, we measure population size in initial period, assuming it to be pre-determined.
33 This, at best, implies for 'Resource Blessing' effects when land per capita is used; however, more importantly it 
provides no evidence for 'Resource Curse' ones.
34 In the cross-federal sample results hold in sign, yet significance drops, possibly due to the small sample size; 
thus, since the relevant comparison in this exercise is between federal-states and sovereign countries, we compare 
results to the cross-country sample given its sufficient size. 
35 For the case of land per capita, significance drops in the intra-federal sample; however, this can still be 
contrasted with the cross-country scenario, where the 'Resource Curse' effects remain significant. 
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3. DISCUSSION
The results of the previous section indicate that at the state-level resource abundance is a blessing, 
yet at the federal (or more generally, sovereign country) level it is rather a curse. Naturally, we ask 
what is the reason for these completely opposite outcomes? We argue the reason lies in the 
difference in mobility costs, which in turn affect the magnitude and direction of 'Dutch Disease' 
symptoms. Nonetheless, although federal-states and sovereign countries are comparable in many 
respects, there could be additional key differences between intra and cross federal environments, 
besides that in mobility costs, which could potentially account for the opposite results; we 
consider two key differences through which we emphasize why the focus should indeed be on
mobility costs. 
Firstly, an intra-federal environment has less variability in institutional quality compared to a 
cross-federal one. This relative homogeneity could potentially account for the opposite result, as a 
viable conjecture could be that such an environment is in fact independent of what has been found 
to be a key determinant of the 'Resource Curse' in the cross-country studies – variability in 
institutional quality (Mehlum et al 2006). However, we argue that despite this homogeneity, the 
intra-federal environment presents sufficient heterogeneity in institutional quality so that in terms 
of generating 'Resource Curse' effects it is of comparable concern to that observed in the cross-
federal (or country) scenario. Indeed, several studies point at the significant variability in 
institutional quality and its increase with resource abundance, at the regional level.36 Let us further 
illustrate this point through the case of the United States, which makes a relevant example given 
its relative homogenous intra-federal environment. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) provide 
evidence for an occurrence of a 'Resource Curse' within the United States and find that corruption 
is a viable transmission channel of it. This implies that despite the homogenous environment, 
variability in corruption level within the United States is sufficiently high to make it a relevant 
transmission channel. To make a stronger argument, let us slightly extend their empirical analysis. 
Thus, we test equation (1) using Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) data set.37 Results appear in Table 
7. In columns one and two we have the resource-share and corruption proxies included; results 
indicate 'Resource Curse' effects and a negative impact of corruption. In column three we follow 
Mehlum et al. (2006) and add an interaction term of resource-share with corruption; the coefficient 
                                                  
36 See Bobonis (2008), Desai et al. (2003), Naritomi et al. (2007), Michaels and Caselli (2009), Monteiro and 
Ferraz (2009), and Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007).
37 Refer to Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) for complete description of variables, and sources. Also, despite not 
presenting results (due to irrelevancy) note that the effect of the interaction term remains to hold even when the 
other variables in their dataset are also included in the regressions, albeit with varying significance. 
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on the interaction term is negative and significant while those on the resource-share and corruption 
proxies become insignificant. This indicates that similar to previous cross-country findings, 
corruption level can be regarded as a generating source for the 'Resource Curse', even within the 
relatively homogenous United States.
Secondly, as opposed to cross-federal settings an intra-federal one presents a unified monetary 
system. This difference may imply that the 'spending effect' of the 'Dutch Disease', which is driven 
by the appreciation of the local currency, would be mitigated at the federal-state level. However, 
as outlined by Sachs and Warner (1999), since it is the real change in prices that affects local 
currency, then it is rather price level differentials that determine the magnitude of the 'spending 
effect'. It is well documented that price levels differentiate at the regional level at least as much as 
they do across countries;38 additional studies show these prices converge more slowly at the 
regional level than at the country level.39 This means that, if anything, the 'spending effect' at the 
federal-state level should be at least as large as it is in sovereign countries, despite the 
homogenous monetary systems. Indeed, Raveh and Papyrakis (2011) show that the spending 
effect is quite substantial at the provincial level in Canada, as resource booms increase provincial 
inflation, which in turn decrease provincial exports; Zhang et al. (2008) provide similar evidence 
for regions in China, albeit without showing the effect on the tradable sectors.     
Therefore, our focus is specifically on the difference in factor mobility costs. In case these are 
viewed as transportation (Krugman, 1991) or transaction (Coase, 1937) costs so that they vary 
with distance, then once they are low enough a resource boom triggers an 'Alberta Effect' that 
potentially overturns the accompanying 'Dutch Disease' symptoms. To better understand the 
suggested mechanism, let us firstly consider the case of Alberta – owning the second largest 
petroleum reserves in the world, Alberta exploits its resource wealth to compete aggressively in 
the inter-provincial competition over production factors; indeed, it presents one of the most 
competitive business tax environments in North America,40 which significantly contributes to it 
having one of the highest investment per capita and immigration levels in Canada for the past 
several decades.41 These attracted factors prevent the manufacturing and other growth-enhancing 
sectors from contracting so that ‘Dutch Disease’ and de-industrialization processes are mitigated 
                                                  
38 See McMahon (1991), Slesnick (2002), and Walden (1998). 
39 See Cecchetti et al. (2002), Culver and Papell (2006), and Roos (2006). 
40 For instance, Alberta presents no provincial retail sales, capital, payroll, or machinery and equipment taxes.
41 This aggressive factor competition triggered by the fiscal advantage provided by the resource-rents and the 
successful factor attraction process that follows forms the basis for the term ‘Alberta Effect’.
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and even reversed;42 this, in turn, leads to ‘Resource Blessing’ effects.43 Nonetheless, exploiting 
resource rents to compete for production factors can, basically, be done by any sovereign resource 
rich country, so that this mechanism should not necessarily be unique to intra-federal cases in-
general, nor to Alberta specifically; however, due to the relatively higher mobility costs between 
countries the factor attraction process does not materialize in the same magnitude that it does in 
Alberta (or in other intra-federal and localized settings that present reduced mobility costs),44 so 
that ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms are not mitigated, and ‘Resource Curse’ outcomes are observed. 
That being said, the case of Alberta serves as a main motivator for the model presented in the 
following section which, to the best of our knowledge, presents a first attempt at connecting 
between the costs of factor mobility and the mitigation process of 'Dutch Disease' symptoms 
through the ‘Alberta Effect’.
4. THE MODEL
In this section we introduce the model and theoretical analysis, in three subsections; the first 
presents the benchmark (symmetric) setup, the second considers a resource-boom through an 
introduction of a resource sector, and the third adds factor mobility costs to the analysis. The main 
objective is to present the suggested mechanism through the simplest framework. Thus, as will be 
outlined in-detail through the introduction of the setup, various simplifying assumptions are taken 
in all aspects of the model. However, there are in addition five critical ones.
Firstly, we assume the main mechanism through which the resource attraction process occurs 
is a tax competition (which can also be interpreted as a subsidy competition); however, we realize 
this can be undertaken through other channels as well, such as competition in infrastructure. This 
is accounted for in the empirical part, where competition in infrastructure and public goods are 
also considered; nevertheless, the tax mechanism is emphasized in the model because despite its 
relative importance,45 it has not been considered previously under an endowment asymmetry
                                                  
42 Indeed, Alberta’s manufacturing sector grew by 50% in the period of 1999-2009 -being well above the growth 
of Alberta’s total economy- contrary to common ‘Dutch Disease’ predictions. 
43 Alberta’s real per capita growth rates have been amongst the highest in Canada, for the past 20 years. 
44 An indication for this is given by the United States Department of Labor reports (in its publication: “Extended 
Mass Layoffs in the First Quarter of 2007”), which mentions that most mass job relocations are from one U.S 
state to another, rather than to an overseas location.  
45 See Newman and Sullivan (1988) for a survey; specifically, Bartik (1985) finds that a ten percent decrease in 
corporate tax increase the number of new plants by to two to three percent, which is quite substantial. Hines 
(1997) presents a similar finding for FDI. Other research showed that tax competition over production factors is a 
viable mechanism at the regional level (see Brueckner 2003, for a survey).
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framework,46 as opposed to the case of infrastructure competition under an endowment asymmetry
environment which has been analyzed by Cai and Treisman (2005).  
Secondly, we assume having an inter-regional tax competition is independent of the
economy's level of institutional quality, so that such a competition may arise regardless of whether 
the economy possesses strong or weak institutions. Scholars contend that inter-regional 
competition punishes wasteful or corrupt governments with capital flight, incentivizing them to 
guarantee secure property rights and provide a hospitable environment for factors.47 Indeed, two 
key examples arise in this context – Russia and China; inter-regional competition over factors is 
observed in each, despite their relative weak institutions.48
Thirdly, as will be evident in the second subsection, we assume the resource endowment is 
capital intensive. Previous studies found that 'Resource Curse' effects are most acute when 
considering point-source resources (mining and quarrying);49 in addition, University of 
Groningen’s cross-country database on ‘Industry Factor Intensity’ ranks ‘Mining and Quarrying’ 
third most capital intensive industry among 32 industries across 30 countries in 1997. Thus, the
emphasis in the model is on capital-based resources. This is a key assumption, because it forms 
the basis for considering competition over capital and concentrating on capital mobility,50 and thus 
making the entire story evolve around capital rather than labor (unlike Wahba (1998) or 
Vermeulen (2010)). In addition, this aligns better with previous studies showing that labor is 
attracted to urbanized and agglomerative areas.51 Since resources tend to locate in non-
agglomerative and remote areas, we argue that any potential factor attraction process should 
indeed emphasize capital over labor.52  
Fourthly, the analysis focuses specifically on the 'resource movement effect' and abstracts 
from considering any 'spending effects'. As was argued in the previous section, the 'spending 
effect' has similar impacts at local and non-local levels, due to the similar levels of price 
                                                  
46 Bucovetsky (1991), Kanbur and Keen (1993), and Wilson (1991) presented models of asymmetric tax 
competition; however, the asymmetry was in terms of different population sizes rather than endowment shocks, 
as it is in this model.   
47 See Qian and Roland (1998), and Montinola, Qian, and Weingast (1995).
48 See Cai and Treisman (2005) for the case of Russia, and Li et al. (2000) for that of China. Also, statements on 
the institutional quality of each were based on the Political Rights Index of Freedom House (2008). 
49 See De Soysa 2000, 2002, Fearon 2005, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Isham et al. 2002, Leite and Weidmann 1999, 
Ross 2001,2003, and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003
50 This will be realized through the analytical analysis in the following section.
51 See Williamson (1988) for a survey.
52 While one can find several definitions for capital in the literature, in the context of this paper 'capital' is mostly 
related to physical capital (such as machinery, plants, etc.). This definition plays a key role in the empirical part.
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differentials in each.53 This leaves us with the 'resource movement effect' as the potential source of 
difference between the intra and cross federal cases. In a sense, this follows Matsuyama's (1992) 
model that also focuses on the 'resource movement effect'; however, his model omits the feature of 
capital accumulation and mobility. Our model extends his work by allowing for that and 
considering the regional fiscal advantage that resource abundance provides; our model shows the 
addition of these features (termed the 'Alberta Effect') reverses his main result.54
Finally, we consider a static, one-period model. The 'Resource Curse' refers to the long term 
effects of resource wealth; thus, transitional effects are not considered, making the usage of a 
multi-period model less relevant. That being said, in the context of this paper, once we assume the 
one period of the model represents the entire transitional period from one steady-state to another, 
adopting a multi-period model does not present further insights beyond those of the static one; 
conversely, it presents unnecessary analytical complications, and divert the focus to issues that are 
of less relevance to the main theme.  In a sense, using a static model is in fact merely a simplifying
feature, as results do not change under either version of the model; however, the critical point 
relates to the results of the previous section. One concern is that the model does not fully explain 
the initial results as it does not consider convergence issues. We address this in two ways. Firstly, 
as outlined in the second subsection, the resource boom is initiated once the economy is in a 
symmetric equilibrium, which means that convergence is in fact held constant and thus accounted 
for. Secondly, the main results of the previous section are re-examined using per capita income,55
instead of growth rates. Results appear in Table 8. The main insights, which under this 
modification can now be better compared to the results of the model, hold in similar significance. 
Columns one and two look into the intra-federal case (using the cross-sectional and panel samples, 
respectively), column three investigates the cross-federal setting, and the last one considers the 
cross-country scenario (for the period of 1977-2008). Through the direction and significance of 
the coefficient of the resource-share proxy, we see the contrast between the intra-federal and the 
                                                  
53 This is especially so when the focus is on capital movement, rather than labor (as in our model). Immigration 
may affect the 'spending effect' as was described by Corden (1984), yet an inflow of physical capital is not 
expected to affect demand or prices, making it less relevant for 'spending effect' analysis.   
54 Yet as opposed to Matsuyama (1992), we neither consider dynamics nor do we assume learning-by-doing 
technology in the manufacturing sector.
55 Equation (1) is retested using real per capita GDP (expressed in US$) instead of growth in the LHS. This is 
tested on the same samples used previously; namely, the intra-federal (cross section and panel), cross-federal, 
and cross-country (for 1977-2008) samples.
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cross federal and country scenarios is maintained, so that 'Resource Blessing' effects are observed 
in the former, while 'Resource Curse' ones are observed in the two latter ones.56     
4.1 Benchmark Setting
Let us consider the benchmark setting of the model, under the framework of the basic capital tax 
competition model of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), in its simplest form. There exists an 
economy with two symmetric regions, each having a manufacturing sector.57 Production in each 
region is undertaken by capital (K) and labor (L), employed through a neoclassical production 
function (F(K,L)); it takes place in the manufacturing sector, to produce a final good (Y) that is 
either consumed (X) or converted to a pure public good (G). The starting population size of each 
region is iL (where NLL  21 );58 labor market is inelastic so that each resident is employed and 
provides one unit of labor. Thus, we have: 
iiiii GXLKFY  ),(                                                                                                                (2)
There is a fixed supply of capital in the economy (where *21 KKK  ), that is equally owned by 
its residents (so that each owns: ** / kNK  ). For starters, capital and labor are perfectly and 
costlessly mobile across the economy. Each region has a government that levies a per-unit, source-
based, capital tax to finance a pure public good, so that:59
iii KTG                                                                                                                                          (3)
The after-tax rate of return on capital is  ; although determined endogenously,  is taken as 
given by each region. Following that, the pre-tax rate of return on capital would be iT . There 
are many firms operating in each of the regions, and there is free entry to the market. Capital 
markets are competitive so that profit maximization by each firm yields:60
                                                  
56 Despite presenting results with all variables in 'Z', the main insights remain to hold in case variables are 
gradually added to 'Z', as in Tables 1 and 2; in addition, despite using primary share of GDP as the resource-share 
proxy in all regressions, results remain to hold when this proxy is instrumented by either mineral share of GDP or 
land per capita (results available from the author). 
57 We take the simplifying assumption of having a closed economy; analyzing an open one neither changes 
results nor adds further insights.
58 Note that throughout the paper ‘i’ represents the region, where )2,1(i . Also in terms of notation, subscripts, 
superscripts, capital letters, and small letters, represent regions, sectors, level variables, and per capita variables, 
respectively.
59 An alternative interpretation for this could be a subsidy; meaning, taxes are levied as described, yet decreasing 
them may be equivalent to giving subsidies, so that a subsidy-competition arises, rather than a tax one.
60 Profit of a representative firm in either of the regions is: ))()(( iiiiii wkTkfL   Therefore, 
profit would be maximized at: 0/ ii dkd . 
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iik Tkf i  )(                                                                                                                              (4)
Also, the free entry condition yields:61
ikii kfkfw i )(                                                                                                                           (5)
Residents of this economy have identical preferences, represented by a strictly quasi-concave 
utility function, U(X,G), with the following properties: ;0,0,,0,  XGGGXXGX UUUUU 62 in 
addition, they own equal shares of the firms, in their respective regions. Therefore, given that 
residents spend all their income on private consumption, a representative resident’s budget 
constraint would be:
*)()( kkTkfx iiii                                                                                                          (6)
Each region competes for the economy’s capital stock, by means of tax competition; thus, a capital
tax competition arises, modeled along Cournot-Nash lines. This is a static, one-period model, 
where the order of events is as follows – each region sets its capital tax level, based on which 
capital is reallocated across the economy; this determines the regional wage and public goods 
levels, based on which labor is allocated across the economy. That said, by equation (4) each 
region derives )( ii Tk so that it can vary ik by its choice of iT . Totally differentiating equation (4) 
with respect to ik and iT , we get:
0
1 
iikki
i
fdT
dk
                                                                                                                                (7)
By equation (3), we get:
i
i
iiii
i
i
dT
dk
LTkL
dT
dG                                                                                                                       (8)
Also, by differentiating equation (6) with respect to iT and substituting equation (7), we get:
i
i
i k
dT
dx                                                                                                                                         (9)
Each region aims to set the tax level that would maximize the welfare of its residents; each would, 
thus, maximize the utility of a representative resident, subject to the budget constraints of the 
                                                  
61 The free entry condition imposes 0 , for all firms in the nation. 
62 In effect, making X and G normal goods with diminishing returns. In addition, we assume marginal utilities of 
X and G go to infinity as each approaches zero, or otherwise go to zero as each approaches infinity.
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region and the resident.63 Therefore, in its simplest form the problem of each of the regions would 
be expressed as follows:64
),(
}{
ii
T
GxUMax
i
Let us denote 
ii XG
UU by );,( ii Gxm thus, we get:
65
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i
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Gxm
dT
dx
                                                                                                             (10)
Substituting equations (8) and (9) to equation (10) and rearranging, we get:66
1
1
1
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dT
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k
T
GxmL                                                                                                        (11)
In equilibrium, the following capital mobility condition must hold:67
21 21
TfTf kk                                                                                                                          (12)
Therefore, in equilibrium equations (11) and (12) must hold, for each of the regions.
Proposition 1. Under the benchmark case, there exists a unique and symmetric Nash Equilibrium 
outcome, in which .,,, 21212121 GGLLTTKK 
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Thus, we see that under the basic setting where the two regions are completely symmetric, 
resources will be allocated equally across the economy, and the manufacturing sectors will be of 
equal size.
                                                  
63 In the tax competition literature the government objective can be expressed in several forms (Wilson 1999). 
The standard way is adopted in this model; however, other models consider different routes such as having a 
leviathan government (Brennan and Buchanan 1980) or a semi self-interest one (Cai and Treisman 2005). While 
this distinction is critical for understanding whether tax competition can discipline governments, it does not play 
a role in the current context; thus, the standard assumption of a benevolent government (or otherwise one that 
wishes to extend its reign by maximizing the welfare of its residents) is taken. 
64 Note that given the assumptions made on the utility function, as well as based on the setting of the problem, 
there would be an interior solution to the given problem, in each of the regions, such that 0,,, iiii xGkT . 
Therefore, corner solutions are not considered in this case.
65 This is derived by totally differentiating ),( ii GxU with respect to ix and .iG
66 The following result replicates that which was derived by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). It can be given 
standard Modified Samuelson Condition (Batina 1990) or Marginal Cost of Public Funds (Browning 1976) 
interpretations, showing how non-cooperative behavior leads to under-provision of public goods. 
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4.2 The Introduction of a Resource Sector
Following Corden (1984), resource booms can be viewed as one of three cases: a technology 
shock in the primary sector, an increase in commodity prices, or a discovery of resources. 
Although our analysis is applicable to each of these, we focus on the latter. Starting at the 
symmetric equilibrium, we introduce a resource sector to region 2.68 Initially, we assume this 
sector is capital intensive, so that, as a simplification, it only employs capital and an exogenous 
and immobile resource endowment (Q), to produce the final good.69 Capital in the resource sector 
is taxed similarly to that in the manufacturing sector (as was modeled previously); in addition, a 
lump-sum tax (z) is imposed on the resource rents. Employing such a tax acts as a simplifying 
feature; imposing distortionary taxes instead will not change results, yet complicate the analysis 
needlessly.70 We assume that at least some of the resource rents accrue to the regional
government. Indeed, this depends on the level of fiscal decentralization. In case it is positive 
(having regional-governments means it is, especially in the context of federal-states) the region 
will have at least some fiscal benefit from the resource.71 In addition, as previously discussed in 
the introduction of the critical assumptions, we assume the region uses this fiscal advantage 
towards the inter-regional competition over capital, regardless of its institutional quality. 
Therefore, in this case the regional budget constraint is:
zKTKTG rrmm  22222                                                                                                           (13)
The technology used in the resource sector differs from that adopted by the manufacturing sector; 
nevertheless, production is modeled also by a neoclassical production function (H(K,Q)), so that:
                                                                                                                                                               
67 Capital will place where its marginal product is higher, until it is equated across regions.
68 More generally, this sector can be regarded as any sector that may significantly enlarge the fiscal capacity of 
the region; indeed, this is not restrictive to resources, but is regarded as such in the current context due to the 
specific observation this model aims to explain. 
69 In terms of notation, since now region 2 has two sectors (manufacturing and resource), a superscript ‘m’ refers 
to the manufacturing sector, while a superscript ‘r’ refers to the resource one (region 1 remains to have one 
sector, as before, so that this notation does not apply to it).
70 Despite its unrealistic characteristics, a lump sum tax is often used in related models as a simplifying 
mechanism that attains a first best outcome; this is in fact how it should be regarded in this case. We, thus, use it 
mainly because it does not change the main results yet is convenient in terms of tractability. Considering a 
different case where all taxable factors (including capital) are levied a lump sum tax instead of a distortionary 
one would change the outcome. Therefore, since having a distortionary tax is more realistic, and since this 
distortion is critical for the outcome, we keep it with the capital, yet change it for a lump sum one with the 
resource rents, where it does not matter for the results yet simplifies the analysis.   
71 We realize a federal government may play a role in this, especially in terms of redistributing resource rents to 
other regions through an equalization payments scheme. However, since even in the most equalized federations 
the fiscal imbalance remains regardless of such schemes (see Boadway 2006 for the case of Canada), we choose 
to abstract from adding this feature to the model, and to focus on maintaining the simplest possible framework 
that will nevertheless present a fiscal imbalance. 
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),(),( 222222 QKHLKFGXY
rm                                                                                    (14)
The resource is equally owned by residents of region 2 (so that: 2
* / LQq  ) and it provides an 
exogenously-determined rate of return of . Therefore, the budget constraint of a representative 
resident in region 2 would be:
**
2222 /)(
2
qkLzkfkfx m
k
m
m                                                                                   (15)
Once again, the regions engage in a capital tax competition. Note that region 1 behaves according 
to the analysis presented previously (since nothing changed there basically); therefore, let us see 
how the situation changes in region 2, as its problem is analyzed as follows:72
),( 22
},,{ 22
GxUMax
zTT mr
Substituting equations (15) and (13) to the given problem, we get the following first order 
conditions:
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LUU GX                                                                                                                                   (16)
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Note that 
mmrr dT
dG
dT
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dT
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dx
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2 ,,, are identical in computation to equations (8) and (9), only with 
the corresponding notation. Thus, if we substitute these to the first order conditions and solve, we 
get the following:
022  mr TT                                                                                                                                 (19)
This means that if the lump sum tax on the resource rents is unrestricted or that otherwise the 
discovered resource is substantial enough (in the sense that sufficient taxes can be levied on the 
resource rents so that the efficient level of public good is supplied) then region 2 can, in fact, 
efficiently lower its capital taxes to zero, while as was seen in the previous analysis, the tax rate of 
                                                  
72 As is implied by the expression of the problem, preferences of region 2’s residents stay as before (over private 
consumption and public goods).
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region 1 remains positive.73 This emphasizes the fiscal advantage the resource gives to the region 
in which it was found.
Proposition 2. When factors of production are completely mobile the Nash Equilibrium outcome 
dictates having ,,,,, 2111121212 zGKTGLLKKkk
mm  so that the manufacturing sector of 
region 2 is larger than that of region 1’s (in per capita terms, as well as in absolute size).
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Therefore, we see that in the extreme case of perfectly mobile factors, an 'Alberta Effect' is 
initiated and as a result ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms are mitigated in the resource abundant region,
to the point where its manufacturing sector actually grows, and are in turn transmitted to the 
resource poor region, where the opposite occurs.
Let us now consider the case where labor is completely immobile between regions (yet capital 
is still freely mobile as before). This case illustrates how the extent to which labor is mobile does 
not affect the mitigation outcome.
Proposition 3. When capital is mobile and labor is immobile the Nash Equilibrium outcome 
dictates having ,,,, 2,111121212 zGKTGLLKKkk
mm  so that the manufacturing sector
of region 2 is larger than that of region 1’s (in per capita terms, as well as in absolute size).
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Let us now consider the extreme case, where both factors are completely immobile between the 
regions (yet are still perfectly mobile within them). Following the analysis of the benchmark case, 
once the resource is discovered the economy is in a symmetric equilibrium. The analysis that 
follows is identical to that which has been presented previously (in both regions 1 and 2), so that 
in equilibrium 022  mr TT and 01 T ; nonetheless, the main result is reversed.
Proposition 4. When factors are completely immobile between regions (yet are mobile within 
them) the Nash Equilibrium outcome dictates having ,,,, 2,111122121 zGKTGLLKKkk
mm 
so that the manufacturing sector of region 1 is larger than that of region 2 (in both per capita and 
absolute terms).
Proof. See Appendix 3.
                                                  
73 The cases of a restricted ‘z’ or a relatively small resource discovery are not analyzed, since they would present 
identical mechanisms (to the one presented) only in smaller magnitudes, deeming them uninteresting in terms of 
providing additional theoretical insights. 
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Thus, when factors are immobile across regions an 'Alberta Effect' does not materialize and thus 
the usual ‘Dutch Disease’ result is derived in the sense that the manufacturing sector of the 
resource abundant region contracts.74 The opposite results of the two extreme cases provide some 
intuition for the mechanics that this model tries to emphasize. When factors are immobile there is 
a 'resource movement effect' towards the resource sector, and the manufacturing sector contracts, 
yet it stays that way because it can not attract the ‘missing’ factors from other regions. When 
factors are mobile, the same happens, yet due to the fiscal advantage that the resource provides the 
manufacturing sector can now attract the ‘missing’ factors so that it maintains its size, or even
grows. The opposite results of the two extreme cases (in conjunction with the insight of 
Proposition 3) show that there exists a threshold of capital mobility-level above which the 
manufacturing sector of the resource abundant region contracts, while below which it does not (or 
even expands), by triggering an ‘Alberta Effect’. Let us derive that threshold level to better 
understand the difference observed initially between the intra and cross federal cases, and to better 
realize the mitigating role of factor mobility.
4.3 The Threshold Cost of Factor-Mobility
Let us now assume that capital does not flow freely between regions, yet is still completely mobile 
within them.75 Specifically, there is an exogenously-determined per-unit cost, which may be 
regarded as a transport cost along Krugman’s (1991) lines or transaction costs following 
Coase (1937), of  for moving capital from one region to the other. This cost is higher the 
farther apart the two regions are (meaning higher distance presents higher ) and is paid by 
firms in the region to which capital is exported to firms of the region from which capital is
imported. Let us denote the total amount of capital in each region )( iK as follows:
76
exim
ii KKKK  *                                                                                                              (20)
Given positive trade, having two regions means one would be a net importer, while the other a 
net exporter, of capital. I define β as the per-unit cost firms in the net importer region pay on 
                                                  
74 To further emphasize how labor mobility does not affect the outcome in this case, in case labor is completely 
mobile in Proposition 4’s setting, the manufacturing sector of region 2 would only further contract, so that not 
only outcome does not change, but it, in fact, amplifies. 
75 As was mentioned at an earlier point, a cost is put on mobility of capital specifically, due to the result of 
Proposition 3; this is largely driven by having a capital intensive resource. 
76 Where superscript ‘*’ denotes the initial level of capital in the region, superscript ‘im’ denotes the level of 
capital imported to the region, and superscript ‘ex’ denotes the level of capital exported from the region. 
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all of the capital employed in that region, and γ as the per-unit sum firms in the net exporter 
region receive on all of the capital employed in that region; therefore, we have:77
i
im
j K
K                                                                                                                               (21)
i
ex
v K
K                                                                                                                                (22)
This means that the rate of return on capital changes in each of the regions, so that in the net 
importer region it is:
ik Tf i                                                                                                                         (23)
While in the net exporter region it is:
ik Tf i                                                                                                                           (24)
Since this is a one period model, the resource sector (once introduced) will only be attracting 
capital up to when capital (in that sector) earns its marginal product; furthermore, since capital 
still moves freely within regions it will only attract capital from the manufacturing sector of 
region 2 (since it is less costly to do so), so that in effect the movement of capital occurs only 
between the two manufacturing sectors. That said, let us assume we are at the stage where the
resource sector is introduced, so that the economy is in a symmetric equilibrium, as was 
shown initially in the benchmark case. As before, each region solves its maximization 
problem, and we get 01 T and 022  mr TT . This means that in case no capital moves 
between regions then the following capital mobility condition holds:
rm kkk
hfTf
221
1                                                                                                                      (25)
Condition (25) implies that rate of return on capital is higher in region 2 (due to the low taxes) as 
was seen in the previous section, so that capital will be imported there. Once that happens, the 
capital mobility condition changes to:
rm kkk
hfTf
221
121                                                                                                      (26)
At this point it is possible to derive the threshold cost )( * above which the 'resource movement 
effect' applies (as in Proposition 4), while below which it is mitigated (as in Propositions 2 and 3), 
as an ‘Alberta Effect’ is triggered. From condition (26) we see that * is determined by the 
                                                  
77 Subscript ‘j’ refers to the region to which payments are made. Subscript ‘v’ refers to the region from which 
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following condition: 112 T  (since at that point rates of return are equated between the two 
manufacturing sectors). Therefore, by substituting equations (21), (22), and (11) to the above 
condition, and solving for * , we get:
0)),(1(
)(
)(
111
12
2
12*
1
11 

 GxmL
UKKK
fKK
G
mim
kk
m
                                                                            (27)
As can be seen * is endogenous to the amount of relocated capital; however, since both the 
elasticity of substitution between private consumption and the public good and the technology 
employed in the manufacturing sectors are not explicitly specified it can not be determined how 
movement of capital between the regions affects the threshold cost. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
make the following inference:78
Proposition 5. If *  then ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms apply (through the 'resource movement 
effect') so that (on per capita terms) the manufacturing sector of region 2 contracts compared to 
that of region 1 (such that );21
mkk  otherwise, if *  then ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms are 
mitigated (by triggering an ‘Alberta Effect’) so that (on per capita terms) the manufacturing 
sector of region 2 maintains its size or expands compared to that of region 1 (such that ).21
mkk 
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Theoretically, in case it is assumed that the cost of factor mobility within federations is equal to or 
below the given threshold, while that across federations is above it, then the model provides an 
explanation to the empirical observation made initially, as it shows how reduced mobility costs 
initiate an 'Alberta Effect' that mitigates and possibly overturns the 'resource movement effect' at 
the local level so that manufacturing sectors of resource abundant federal-states are not contracted 
and so, in turn, ‘Resource Blessing’ effects are observed. 
5. EMPIRICAL TESTING
Let us take the United States as a case study, and through an intra-federal analysis undertake two 
tests;79 the first to realize whether the 'Alberta Effect' applies, and the second to investigate
whether 'Dutch Disease' symptoms are indeed mitigated (or even reversed) in resource abundant 
states, as theory suggests.  
                                                                                                                                                               
payments were received. 
78 Since the initial empirical observations were made on per capita basis, the comparisons to follow (between the 
two manufacturing sectors) are also made on per capita terms. 
79 The sample includes the 50 states, and the District of Columbia. Given their high heterogeneity in resource 
abundance, this makes a valid case study.
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5.1 Does the 'Alberta Effect' apply in resource abundant states?
The previous section implies that in case the 'Alberta Effect' applies, resource abundance should 
affect the inflow of physical capital through the business environment; therefore, let us test the 
following model:80
                                                                                                                                                       (29)
                                                                                                                                                       (30)
                                                                                                                                                       (31)
In terms of notation, 'FDI' is average per capita Foreign Direct Investment in physical capital in 
1997-2006.81 'B' represents the business environment, measured in three ways to capture the
different competition mechanisms; firstly, by the 2006 'State Business Tax Climate Index' of the 
US Tax Foundation,82 secondly by average per capita expenditure on infrastructure in 1997-2006, 
and thirdly by average per capita public good provision in 1997-2006.83 'R' is the previously used
measure of resource abundance (primary share of GDP in initial year). R * is an exogenous 
measure of resource abundance measured as before by either mineral share of GDP or land per 
capita (both in initial year).84 Finally, 'X' is a vector of controls that includes investment, openness, 
human capital, institutional quality, and a dummy for landlocked.85 We address the potential 
endogeneity bias of this vector with the business environment or the inflow of capital in two ways. 
Firstly, we express all variables in initial year and assume them to be pre-determined; secondly, 
albeit presenting results with 'X', we note these do not change (qualitatively) in case 'X' is not 
included or that otherwise its variables are gradually added to the regression,86 implying that even 
in case such a bias exists, it does not alter results.
                                                  
80 Wherever possible, variables are expressed in per capita terms, due to the analysis made in the theoretical 
section; nonetheless, note that results do not change in case these are otherwise expressed as share of GDP 
(results available from the author).
81 The investigated period is the maximum available. Data is expressed is millions of US$, 2000 prices. Due to 
data limitations, District of Columbia, Montana, North and South Dakota, Nevada, and Wyoming are excluded 
from the sample. Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
82 The ‘State Business Tax Climate Index’ (referred to as 'General Tax' in the regression results table) is an index 
that ranks US states by their 'tax-friendliness' to business. The index is a number from 1 to 10, where 10 is 
friendliest. 2006 is the earliest year for which this index is available. Unlike other possible measures, such as for 
instance per capita tax payment, which do not hold key factors (as the size of the tax base) constant, this index is 
an objective one that directly compares between the competitiveness of the tax environment of the various states.
83 Per capita expenditures on infrastructure and public goods are expressed in million of US$, 2000 prices. Period 
investigated corresponds to that of the capital inflow. Source: US Census Bureau.  
84 For more detailed description of the measures used in 'R', and 'R * ' (including sources), see Section 2.
85 Variables that appear in 'X' are identical in description and source to the ones used in the previous analysis; see 
Section 2 for further details.  
86 Results available from the author.
iii
iiii
iiii
RR
XRB
XBFDI






*10
210
210
26
26
We follow the identification strategy of Acemoglu et al. (2000). Thus, we start by reporting 
correlations between 'R' and 'R * '. Results appear in Table 9. Land per capita and mineral share 
explain approximately 36 and 76 percent of variation in primary share, respectively. Given this 
result, we insert 'R * ' directly in equation (30) -so that 'R' represents each of the three measures-
and estimate equation (30). Results appear in Table 10; these provide an indication for the positive 
and significant affect of resource abundance on each of the three types of business environment. 
Next, we estimate equations (29) and (30) using two-stage least squares. Results appear in Table 
11. The top panel presents second-stage estimations, and the lower one presents first-stage results 
(which follow results of Table 10). The positive and significant results of 1 in all regressions 
indicate that resource abundance leads to increased inflows of physical capital through the 
business environment – validating the 'Alberta Effect' mechanism. We further confirm this by 
showing that capital inflows are not affected directly by resources. Thus, we estimate equation 
(29), replacing 'B' with 'R'. Results appear in Table 12. Coefficients of each of the resource 
abundance measures are positive, yet not significant. This further supports the conjecture that 
resources affect capital inflows indirectly through the business environment, rather than directly 
due to their capital intensity. 
Previous studies show this mechanism is not as applicable once mobility costs are not low 
enough, as the model suggests. Through a large panel of countries Poelhekke and Van der Ploeg 
(2011) show that resource abundance crowds out aggregate Foreign Direct Investment, which is
an opposite result to the above one.87 As was found in the earlier analysis of the 'Resource Curse' 
hypothesis (discussed in Section 2), the opposite results between the intra-federal and cross-
country scenarios are also observed in this mechanism, implying once more for the importance of 
factor mobility costs in this context.  
5.2 Are 'Dutch Disease' symptoms mitigated, or even reversed, in resource abundant states?
As explained initially, according to 'Dutch Disease' theory resource abundance leads to 
contraction of the manufacturing sector. Thus, let us test the following model:
                                                                                                                                                       (31)
                                                  
87 Evidence for the relationship between resource abundance and the business environment under a cross-country 
framework are scarce; however, Poelhekke and Van der Ploeg (2011) already test for the end result (relationship 
between resource abundance and FDI), implying that the 'Alberta Effect' does not apply when tested on sovereign 
countries (meaning, once mobility costs are not sufficiently low). 
ittiitititit XRManMan   32010 )ln(
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This is an identical model to the one presented in (1), only here we check for growth rates in the 
manufacturing sector specifically. Thus, 'Man' is the growth rate of the manufacturing sector. The 
manufacturing sector itself, however, is measured in two ways; the first is its product as share of 
GDP, and the second is its employment as share of total employment. As before, the sample 
covers the period of 1977-2008,88 where 'Man 0 ' is the initial manufacturing-level (capturing
convergence phenomena), 'R' is the resource-share proxy measured by primary share of GDP in 
initial year, 'X' is a vector of controls identical to the one used in Section 5.1,  is a state-dummy, 
and  is a time-dummy. As in Section 2, to account for the possible endogeneity of the resource-
share proxy, we instrument it using either mineral share of GDP or land per capita. Also, to 
address both the potential endogeneity of the vector 'X' and the possibility of an omitted variable 
bias, we measure all variables in initial year (assume they are pre-determined), and undertake 
panel estimation with fixed effects, in addition to a cross-sectional analysis.89 In both the cross-
sectional and panel cases results do not change (qualitatively) in case 'X' is not included, or 
otherwise included with gradual addition of variables,90 in the regressions so that in case it indeed 
creates an endogeneity bias, it does not alter results. 
Results appear in Tables 13 and 14, for the cross-sectional and panel estimations, respectively. 
In each, the top panel presents the second stage results (where applicable), and the lower one 
presents the first stage results (where applicable). In the top panel, the first three columns cover 
the cases where manufacturing is expressed as share of GDP, and the remaining ones cover the 
cases where it is expressed as share of its employment out of total employment. The positive and 
mostly significant results of 2 in all regressions indicate that 'Dutch Disease' symptoms are 
indeed mitigated or reversed in resource rich states as the model suggests, since they imply that 
resource abundant states have a faster-growing manufacturing sector (or, at the least, not a slower-
growing one), unlike predictions of the 'Dutch Disease' theory.91 In addition, results also indicate 
that to some extent 'Dutch Disease' symptoms are transmitted to resource poor (factor exporters) 
states, which is consistent with the model as well as with Wahba's (1998) theory regarding this. 
                                                  
88 All data was retrieved from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
89 The panel is divided to sub-periods of five years, covering 1977-2008. 
90 Results available from the author
91 The results of the regressions that use manufacturing-employment (as share of total employment) are less 
significant than the ones of the regressions that use manufacturing-product (as share of GDP). Although this does 
not imply for reversed 'Dutch Disease' symptoms at the employment-level, it nevertheless shows that these 
effects are mitigated, which is a relevant result for validating the suggested theory. In addition, this also implies 
that capital has greater impact than labor in this context, as the model suggests. 
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Once again, similar tests provide an opposite result once employed under a cross-county 
framework (where mobility costs are higher); investigating oil exporting countries, Ismail (2010) 
shows that resource booms lead to a contraction of the manufacturing sector, as 'Dutch Disease' 
theory predicts. This contrast in results emphasizes further how critical mobility costs can be to
'Dutch Disease' theory.           
                                                                                         
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The paper starts with an intriguing empirical observation – at the federal-state level (within 
federations) resource abundance is a 'blessing', while at the federal level (between federations) it is 
rather a 'curse', consistent with findings of previous cross-country studies. After considering 
various potential differences between the intra and cross federal settings, we point at the 
differences in mobility costs as the trigger for the different outcomes. Motivated by the case of 
Alberta, we extend the basic capital tax competition model of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) to 
present a novel mechanism (titled the 'Alberta Effect') through which the mitigation (and possible 
reversion) process of 'Dutch Disease' effects, that forms the basis for the opposite outcomes,
occurs. We argue that once mobility costs are low enough, resource abundant regions initiate an
'Alberta Effect' –where they exploit the fiscal advantage provided by their resources to compete 
more aggressively in the inter-regional competition over production factors, and as a result attract 
vast amounts of capital– which mitigates and potentially overturns the usual 'Dutch Disease' 
effects. Also, the model is consistent with Wahba's (1998) theory, showing that reduced mobility 
costs can lead to transmission of 'Dutch Disease' symptoms to resource poor (factor exporters) 
regions. In the last section we undertake an intra-federal analysis of the United States to provide 
some empirical validation for the suggested mechanism. Results confirm the main implications of 
the model as we observe that resource abundant states indeed attract greater amounts of physical 
capital by presenting more competitive business environments (in the form of more competitive 
taxation, greater expenditures on infrastructure, and greater public good provision) which in turn 
expand their manufacturing sectors, so that 'Dutch Disease' effects are reversed and to some extent 
transmitted to the resource poor states. Thus, through the case of federations this paper 
demonstrates the importance of factor mobility in 'Dutch Disease' theory, especially in the regional 
context where resource abundance can possibly lead to regional fiscal imbalances. 
These insights may carry certain policy implications for resource rich economies, especially 
for those with multiple neighboring regions that can act as potential factor exporters. Nonetheless, 
due to the limited sample size, it is important to realize that results may be sensitive to the specific 
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periods or federations investigated. Future research may test the presented hypothesis for extended 
periods of time and additional federations.     
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Appendix 1 – Data sources and periods observed: Federal-states
Australia – The period investigated is 1990-2009, for the 8 regions. All data was retrieved from 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Belgium – The period investigated is 1999-2007, for the 3 regions. All data was retrieved from the 
Institute of National Accounts of Belgium.
Brazil – The period investigated is 1995-2007, for the 27 regions. All data was retrieved from the 
Statistical Institute of Brazil.
Canada – The period investigated is 1984-2008 for the 10 provinces, Yukon. Nunavut and 
Northwest Territories are sampled separately from 1999-2008, whereas from 1984-1999 they are 
considered a single territory (under the name ‘Nunavut and Northwest Territories’). All data was 
retrieved from Statistics Canada.
Germany – The period investigated is 1991-2009, for the 16 Landers. All data was retrieved from 
the Federal Statistics Office of Germany.
India – The period investigated is 1980-2008, for the 27 states. Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, 
Uttarakhand, and Chandigarh are sampled from 1993-2008; also, Mizoram is sampled for 1999-
2008. All data was retrieved from the Ministry of Statistics of India.
Malaysia – The period investigated is 2005-2008, for the 15 states. All data was retrieved from the 
Department of Statistics of Malaysia.
Russia – The period investigated is 2004-2008 for 77 federal subjects. Due to limitations of data 
availability the following federal subjects were not included in the sample: Nenets Autonomous 
District, Chechen Republic, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous, Okrug-Ugra, Jewish 
Region, Trans-Balkai, and Yamalo-Nenets District. All data was retrieved from the Federal Statistics 
Service of Russia. 
United Arab Emirates – The period investigated is 2000-2007, for the 7 states. All data was 
retrieved from the Ministry of Economy of the United Arab Emirates.
United States – The period investigated is 1977-2008, for the 50 states, the District of Columbia. 
All data was retrieved from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Initial income in each federal state was computed as follows – for each region real per capita GDP 
is taken and divided by the corresponding exchange rate measure that converts it to US$;92
thereafter, to normalize the figures (since each correspond to a different year) this measure is 
further divided by the corresponding real per capita GDP of the US (such that if the converted 
income measure is from 1990, then it is divided by the real per capita GDP of the US in 1990). 
This converted and normalized measurement is used as initial income (and can be compared 
across federations and across years)
                                                  
92 Exchange rate measures were taken from version 6.3 of the Penn World Tables. 
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Appendix 2 – Graphs for the separate federations as well as for additional similar cases
Australia, 1990-2009
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Germany, 1991-2009
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Canada, 1984-2008
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Malaysia, 2005-2008
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Russia, 2004-2008
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G = .0182085 + .0148108 R
R-squared = 0.1289
G = .0147159 + .0486238 R
R-squared = 0.1836
G = .009888 + .1999782 R
R-squared = 0.4291
G = .0181087 + .0317517 R
R-squared = 0.1687
G = .0649196 + .0285786 R
R-squared = 0.0511
G = .0774648 + .0566971 R
R-squared = 0.031
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India, 1980-2008
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United Arab Emirates, 2000-2007
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Europe, 1995-2008
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China, 1994-2008
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G = .0290523 + .3118108 R
R-squared = 0.2252
G = .0213926 + .0117045 R
R-squared = 0.006
G = .0327424 + .0105524 R
R-squared = 0.0198
G = .0226639 - .0012689 R
R-squared = 0.00
G = .0109821 + .3913342 R
R-squared = 0.8015
G = .0030653+ .0387144 R
R-squared = 0.1671
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Spain, 1995-2007
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As can be seen, a few of the federations (Australia, Brazil, Germany, Canada, Belgium, UAE) 
present positive relationship between resource abundance and growth, while the rest present no 
observed relationship; however – interestingly (and perhaps more importantly), none of them 
show any indication for an occurrence of a 'Resource Curse'.
Graphs for China, Spain, and Europe, depict a similar picture to the one observed in federations. 
Europe shows some indication for a 'Resource Blessing', while Spain and China show no relation 
between resource abundance and growth (this follows the results on Zhang et al (2008) who 
looked into ‘Resource Curse’ effects in China); meaning, no 'Resource Curse' is observed in none 
of the cases, implying that the suggested mechanism may be relevant for other regional regimes 
(besides federations) that may still present lower costs for factor mobility (compared to cross-
country scenarios).
Data sources and periods observed: Non-federal subjects
(Note: all basic (non-transformed) figures are in millions of local currency).
Spain – Data (average annual real per capita GDP, production of primary sector in initial year) on 
the 19 Spanish regions covers the period of 1995-2007. All data was retrieved from the National 
Statistics Institute of Spain.
Europe – Data (average annual real per capita GDP, production of primary sector in initial year) 
on the 15 European-Union members (as of 1995) covers the period of 1995-2008. Note that the 
result does not change if members that were added to the Union at a later are included. All data 
was retrieved from Euro-stat (Central Statistics Institute of the European-Union).
China – Data (average annual real per capita GDP, production of primary sector in initial year) on 
the 26 Chinese provinces covers the period of 1994-2008 (note that the sample starts in 1994 due 
to the price liberalization scheme in the resource sector that went into action in 1994 (see Zhang et 
al. (2008)); prior to 1994 prices in the resource sector were heavily regulated by the federal 
regime, which decreases the relevance of investigating that period, given the context of the 
hypothesis). All data was retrieved from the National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
G = .0299281 + .0154119 R
R-squared = 0.0132
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Appendix 3 – Proofs for Propositions 1 – 5 
Proof of Proposition 1
The symmetric outcome, where the regions choose an equal tax rate (and so other indicators are 
equal as well) follows equations (11) and (12), and so it is a viable option. Interestingly, it is also a 
unique option –
 In a first scenario, let us assume that 21 TT  and 12 GG  . By (12) we get that 12 kk  , 
which means that 12 xx  ; since the level of public good in region 2 is at least as high as 
that in region 1, then labor will move to region 2 down to at least where 21 kk  ; once that 
occurs (12) does not hold. Thus, rate of return of capital and the regional wage rates can 
not be equal at the same time, so that equilibrium does not arise. What will happen, in fact, 
is that capital and labor will continue to move to region 2 so that in the limit region 1 
vanishes.93  
 In a second scenario, let us assume that 21 TT  yet also 21 GG  . The higher tax rate in 
region 1 means that there would be more capital in region 2, making its tax base larger 
than that of region 1. Taking the first scenario into account, region 2 knows that once its 
public good level is at least as high as that of region 1 it will make region 1 vanish in the 
limit; thus, given its higher tax base region 2 would be able to raise its tax to a point where 
it is still below that of region 1 yet it equalizes the levels of public goods between the 
regions (causing that which was described in the previous scenario, where region 1 
vanishes in the limit).
The two above scenarios work both ways (meaning, not only when region 1 presents higher taxes, 
but also vice versa), which means that no region 1 can allow itself to present lower taxes than its 
neighbor or otherwise it will vanish in the limit. Thus, the only viable option is when tax rates are 
equal and a completely symmetric outcome arises.                                                                             
Proof of Proposition 2
The updated free capital mobility condition would be:
1122
Tfhf kkk rm    
This by itself means that in equilibrium capital per capita as well as capital in absolute level will 
be higher in the manufacturing sector of region 2. When it comes to labor, in case 11KTz  then 
labor will move to region 2 so that 12 LL  (since both wage levels and public good levels would 
be higher in region 2); otherwise, due to the same reasons outlined in the proof of Appendix 3, by 
having a larger tax base than that of region 1, region 2 would be able to at least equalize its public 
good provision level to that of region 1, so that even in that case labor will be drawn to region 2 
and we would get 12 LL  . Thus, once taxes decrease to zero in region 2 we get the suggested 
equilibrium outcome, where the manufacturing sector is larger in region 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof for Proposition 2 remains applicable for this case, with the slight modification of having 
immobile labor, which maintains the regional population sizes equal, so that the above outcome is 
reached. 
                                                  
93 Nonetheless, note that the concept of the limit in this context represents the long term, and is only mentioned 
here under purely theoretical terms. 
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Proof of Proposition 4
Once the resource sector is introduced, it attracts capital only from the manufacturing sector of the 
same region (since factors are only immobile across regions), so that the result is reached.
Proof of Proposition 5
When *  then regional rates of return dictate that it is not efficient for region 1 to export
capital to the manufacturing sector of region 2 (established by condition (26)); on the other hand, 
for the same reason region 1 will not import from region 2 (established by condition (25)). Thus, 
once the resource sector is introduced in region 2 it attracts capital from the manufacturing sector 
of the same region, causing for its contraction; this contraction remains in equilibrium since no 
capital is drawn from region 1 (so that ).21
mkk  However – in case *  then rates of return on 
capital will be higher in the manufacturing sector of region 2 due to the low taxes (seen through 
condition (26)), and capital will flow there from region 1 (so that an ‘Alberta Effect’ is triggered) 
and its contraction (caused by the introduction of the resource sector) is mitigated and potentially 
even reversed, such that mkk 21  in equilibrium.
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Tables
TABLE 1. Growth regressions, as in equation (1), for federal-states (OLS)
Dependent 
variable: G
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Resource-
share
0.0327***
(0.0114)
0.0331156*
(0.017)
0.0391***
(0 .010261)
0.03908**
(0.012193)
0.0423**
(0.0138634)
0.042241**
(0.0134074)
Initial 
Income
-0.00706**
(0.002268)
-0.00301**
(0.001312)
-0.0034**
(0.001317)
-0.003998*
(0.00204)
-0.00423
(0.00262)
Human 
Capital
0.0371***
(0.005018)
0.0354***
(0.005312)
0.03315***
(0.0072184)
0.0329***
(0.0068741)
Institutional 
quality
0.0497**
(0.016133)
0.04127***
(0.016133)
0.0406***
(0.0118651)
Investment
0.03622
(0.0353631)
0.0366461 
(0.0368983)
Openness
0.0817653 
(0.3193)
R-squared 0.6906 0.6959 0.7206 0.7251 0.7425 0.7427
N 247 247 241 234 234 234
Note: Standard errors are robust, clustered by federation. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in parentheses. Superscripts 
correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. Despite not presenting their results, dummies (federal, time, and landlocked effects) and 
intercepts are included in all regressions.
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TABLE 2. Growth regressions, as in equation (1), for the 10 federations (Panel, Fixed Effects)
Dependent 
variable: G
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Resource-
share
-0.0235
(0.0192)
-0.0904** 
(0.03)
-0.154***
(0.027)
-0.1268***
(0.0236)
-0.1264***
(0.0228)
-0.0611
(0.049)
Initial 
Income
-0.0074***
(0.0011)
-0.0092***
(0.0008)
-0.0102***
(0.001)
-0.0099***
(0.0014)
-0.0132***
(0.002)
Openness
0.03***
(0.006)
0.04***
(0.011)
0.04***
(0.011)
0.04***
(0.01)
Institutional 
Quality
0.006**
(0.0024)
0.006**
(0.0025)
0.007**
(0.003)
Investment
-0.01
(0.07)
0.05
(0.06)
Human 
Capital
0.005
(0.003)
R-squared 0.5932 0.693 0.8069 0.8338 0.8347 0.8609
N 35 35 35 35 35 35
Note: Standard errors are robust, clustered by federation. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in parentheses. Superscripts 
correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. Despite not presenting their results, fixed effects (federal, time, and landlocked effects) 
and an intercept are included in all regressions.
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TABLE 3. Growth regressions, as in equation (1), for sovereign countries
Sachs and Warner (1997) 
Period: 1965-1990
Sachs and Warner Extended
Period: 1977-2008
Dependent 
variable: 
G
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Resource-
share
-0.066***
(0.016)
-0.076***
(0.0205)
-0.07***
(0.02)
-0.064***
(0.012)
-0.065***
(0.012)
-0.04*
(0.012)
-0.067***
(0.021)
-0.071***
(0.023)
-0.071***
(0.02)
-0.061**
(0.02)
Initial 
Income
0.0005
(0.0017)
-0.0043
(0.0033)
-0.013***
(0.0032)
-0.014***
(0.0025)
-0.015***
(0.0027)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.002)
Human 
Capital
0.033
(0.02)
0.025*
(0.0146)
0.0032
(0.0135)
-0.003
(0.014)
0.0002**
(0.00009)
0.0002**
(0.0001)
0.0002**
(0.0001)
0.0002**
(0.00102)
Investment
0.024***
(0.0038)
0.016***
(0.0032)
0.016***
(0.0034)
0.015
(0.017)
0.015
(0.019)
0.01
(0.02)
Openness
0.0244***
(0.00402)
0.019***
(0.0043)
0.00012
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.005)
Institutional 
quality
0.0017*
(0.0009)
0.00008
(0.0011)
R-squared 0.192 0.2258 0.5349 0.7098 0.7384 0.17 0.4209 0.4284 0.4284 0.4326
N 102 86 86 82 77 84 71 71 71 68
Note: Standard errors are robust. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in parentheses. Superscripts correspond to a 10, 5 and 
1% level of significance. A dummy for landlocked sovereign countries and an intercept are included in all regressions. 
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TABLE 4. Growth regressions, as in equation (1), for federal states (OLS)
Group 1
(Federal States of: Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Germany, United States)
Group 2
(Federal States of: Brazil, India, Malaysia, 
Russia, United Arab Emirates)
Dependent 
variable: 
G
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Resource-
share
0.0182
(0.0261)
0.0241
(0.0234)
0.0251
(0.0222)
0.029
(0.0234)
0.0297 
(0 .024)
0.034*
(0.0153)
0.041***
(0.0072)
0.048**
(0.0112)
0.05***
(0.01)
0.047***
(0.0126)
Initial 
Income
-0.014***
(0.00303)
-0.0076 
(0.0053)
-0.0074
(0.0054)
0.00508 
(0.003)
0.0039 
(0.0022)
-0.0065
(0.0032)
-0.003
(0.0013)
-0.00464
(0.004)
-0.0049
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.0041)
Human 
Capital
0.023***
(0.0037)
0.021***
(0.0014)
0.025***
(0.0036)
0.02***
(0.0027)
0.037***
(0.0023)
0.045***
(0.00185)
0.04***
(0.002)
0.042***
(0.0013)
Investment
0.00582
(0.0072)
0 .00165
(0 .0104)
0.0021
(0.0105)
0.067 
(0.064)
0.066
(0.065)
0.0663
(0.066)
Openness -0.0688
(0.0198)
-0.068**
(0.0195)
0.0224
(0.018)
0.0304
(0.0196)
Institutional 
quality
0.028
(0.036
0.049**
(0.013)
Federal 
Corruption 
Level
Federal 
Corruption 
x Resource-
share
R-squared 0.3576 0.4651 0.4749 0.6906 0.6998 0.6046 0.6225 0.6651 0.6664 0.6690
N 92 92 92 92 92 155 149 149 149 142
Note: Standard errors are robust, clustered by federation. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in parentheses. Superscripts 
correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. Despite not presenting their results, dummies (federal, time, and landlocked effects) and 
an intercept are included in all regressions.
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TABLE 5. Growth regressions, as in equation (1), for federal states (Panel, Fixed Effects)
Dependent 
variable: 
G
(1)
(Primary 
Share)
(2)
(Primary 
Share)
(3)
(Primary 
Share)
(4)
(Primary 
Share)
(5)
(Primary 
Share)
(6)
(Mineral 
Share –
Proxy)
(7)
(Mineral 
Share – IV, 
Second Stage)
(8)
(Land –
Proxy) 
(9)
(Land – IV, 
Second Stage)
Resource-
share
0.03322
(0.023)
0.0657***
(0.0233)
0.0655***
(0.0226)
0.065***
(0.0228)
0.066***
(0.02281)
0.07088**
(0.02965)
0.0748**
(0.03051)
0.00188 
(0.0018)
0.07827 
(0.07577)
Initial 
Income
-0.0054
(0.007802)
-0.0064
(0.00802)
-0.01066*
(0.00644)
-0.0108*
(.00641)
-0.0108*
(0.0063)
-0.01706**
(0.0012)
-0.011*
(0.0064)
-0.01011
(0.0073)
-0.0113*
(0.00183)
Human 
Capital
0.01875**
(0.00823)
0.0221***
(0.008133)
0.0217***
(0.008123)
0.0212***
(0.00813)
0.02045**
(0.00825)
0.02183***
(0.007979)
0.0169**
(0.0094)
0.02205**
(0.010814)
Investment
0.0775**
(0.03898)
0.0778**
(0.03906)
0.0773**
(0.0386)
0.0784**
(0.039693)
0.0773**
(0.0379)
0.0768**
(0.03927)
0.0772**
(0.03782)
Openness
0.05567
(0.16884)
0.05633
(0.1689)
0.06325 
(0.16953)
0.0519
(0.1684)
0.08979
(0.16853)
0.05015
(0.17362)
Institutional 
quality
0.04726
(0.0743)
0.06857
(0.07798)
0.05113
(0.0741)
0.0167
(0.07405)
0.05268
(0.0834)
R-squared 0.4982 0.6005 0.6151 0.6153 0.6155 0.6141 0.6154 0.6079 0.6152
N 711 598 598 598 598 598 598 598 598
First Stage Results
Dependent 
Variable: 
Primary-
Share
Mineral 
Share
Land
Initial 
Income
Human 
Capital
Investment Openness
Institutional 
quality
R-squared N
(7)
0.09***
(0.034)
-0.039***
(0.009)
0.214**
(0.095)
0.092*
(0.0505)
-0.3207
(0.202)
0.153*
(0.085)
0.1597 598
(9)
0.004**
(0.002)
-0.032***
(0.0102)
0.169*
(0.093)
0.089*
(0.048)
-0.287
(0.183)
0.086
(0.078)
0.1423 598
Note: Standard errors are robust clustered by federal-states. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in parentheses. Superscripts 
correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. Despite not presenting results, fixed effects (time, state, landlocked, etc. effects) and an 
intercept are included in all regressions.
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TABLE 6. Growth regressions, as in equation (1), for federal states, federations, and sovereign 
countries, using exogenous variation in resource-share
Intra-Federal, 1977-2008
(Cross Section)
Cross-Country, 1977-2008
(Cross Section)
Dependent variable: G Proxy IV (Second Stage) Proxy IV (Second Stage)
(1)
Mineral-
Share
(2)
Land
(3)
Mineral-
Share
(4)
Land
(5)
Mineral-
Share
(6)
Land
(7)
Mineral-
Share
(8)
Land
Resource-share
0.041***
(0.007)
0.00007
(0.0008)
0.042***
(0.005)
0.003
(0.0302)
-0.063***
(0.022)
-0.003**
(0.001)
-0.062***
(0.019)
-0.15***
(0.046)
Initial Income
-0.006*
(0.003)
-0.004**
(0.002)
-0.0047*
(0.002)
-0.004***
(0.001)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.004*
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.002
(0.003)
Human Capital
0.034***
(0.008)
0.03***
(0.0063)
0.0302***
(0.06)
0.0302***
(0.0054)
0.0002**
(0.0001)
0.0003**
(0.054)
0.0002**
(0.0001)
-0.00006
(0.0001)
Investment
0.035
(0.036)
0.034
(0.03)
0.036
(0.032)
0.034
(0.031)
0.01
(0.01)
0.02
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
0.03
(0.02)
Openness 0.085
(0.322)
0.0778
(0.373)
0.073
(0.285)
0.08
(0.311)
-0.004
(0.006)
-0.003
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.005)
0.008
(0.007)
Institutional quality 0.036**
(0.013)
0.037***
(0.011)
0.045***
(0.01)
0.037***
(0.012)
0.00007
(0.0011)
0.002
(0.001)
0.00006
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.0015)
R-squared
0.7389 0.7352 0.7467 0.7368 0.4281 0.271 0.4325 0.1488
N 234 234 234 234 68 90 68 68
First Stage Results
Dependent 
Variable: 
Primary- Share
Mineral Share Land
Initial
Income
Human 
Capital
Investment Openness
Institutional 
quality
R-
squared
N
(3)
0.95***
(0.07)
-0.05**
(0.02)
0.34
(0.43)
-0.043
(0.026)
0.09
(0.589)
0.119*
(0.06)
0.8300 235
(4)
0.024***
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.017)
-0.38
(0.63)
-0.062***
(0.016)
-1.09
(2.002)
0.118
(0.082)
0.5923 235
(7)
0.989***
(0.025)
0.0005
(0.003)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.02
(0.02)
0.01
(0.01)
0.0002
(0.002)
0.9715 70
(8)
0.024***
(0.008)
0.076**
(0.03)
-0.003***
(0.0008)
-0.1
(0.2)
0.1**
(0.07)
-0.024*
(0.013)
0.4908 70
Note: Standard errors are robust clustered by federal-states. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in parentheses. Superscripts 
correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. A dummy for landlocked states and sovereign countries and an intercept are included in 
all regressions. 
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TABLE 7. Growth regressions, as in equation (1), for US States, using Papyrakis and Gerlagh 
(2007) dataset 
Dependent 
variable: G
(1) (2) (3)
Resource-
share
-5.266***
(1.774)
-4.341**
(1.704)
7.5866
(5.135)
Corruption
-0.1553***
(0.06)
0.015
(0.097)
Resource-
Share x 
Corruption
-2.99**
(1.17)
R-squared 0.1578 0.2709 0.3634
N 49 49 49
Note: Standard errors are robust. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in parentheses. Superscripts correspond to a 10, 5 and 
1% level of significance. The District of Columbia and Delaware are not included in the sample. An intercept is included in all regressions.
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TABLE 8. Growth regressions, as in equation (1), using per capita income instead of growth
Dependent 
variable: 
Per Capita 
GDP
(1)
Intra-Federal Analysis
(Cross-Section)
(2)
Intra-Federal Analysis
(Panel, Fixed Effects)
(3)
Cross-Federal Analysis
(Panel, Fixed Effects)
(4)
Cross-Country Analysis
(Cross-Section, 1977-
2008)
Resource-
share
0.1801*
(0.091)
0.601***
(0.0454)
-0.935***
(0.1789)
-1.88**
(0.736)
Initial 
Income
0.981***
(0.0143)
0.8542***
(0.052)
0.8582***
(0.0414)
0.9086***
(0.064)
R-squared 0.9902 0.9455 0.9948 0.9458
N 235 598 35 68
Note: Standard errors are robust clustered by federation (in (1) and (3)) or state (in (2)). Standard deviations for independent variables appear 
in parentheses. Superscripts correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. Although results are not presented, all regressions include 
Human Capital, Institutional Quality, Investment, Openness, relevant dummy variables (federal, landlocked in case fixed effects not included, 
etc.) and an intercept.
48
48
TABLE 9. Estimating equation (31) for US federal-subjects (OLS)
Dependent variable:
Primary Share
(1977)
(1)
Mineral
Share
(1977)
(2)
Land
(1977)
0.96131***
(0 .03465)
0.02713***
(0.0065)
R-squared 0.7903 0.3616
N 51 51
Note: Standard errors are robust. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in parentheses. Superscripts correspond to a 10, 5 and 
1% level of significance. An intercept is included in all regressions.
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TABLE 10. Estimating equation (30) for US federal subjects (OLS)
Dependent variable:
Business 
Environment
(1)
General 
Tax
(2)
General 
Tax
(3)
General 
Tax
(4)
Infrastructure
(5)
Infrastructure
(6)
Infrastructure
(7)
Public 
Goods
(8)
Public 
Goods
(9)
Public 
Goods
Mineral Share
5.427***
(1.72)
16692.33**
(6671)
15504**
(6395)
Land 0.314***
(0.097)
571.52***
(178)
602.5***
(162)
Primary Share 6.243***
(1.43)
14758.15**
(6670)
15515**
(7089)
R-squared
0.4406 0.4629 0.4724 0.5090 0.2718 0.2718 0.4991 0.3187 0.3187
N 51 51 51 50 50 50 50 50 50
Note: Standard errors are robust. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in parentheses. Superscripts correspond to a 10, 5 and 
1% level of significance. The following variables are included in all regressions but not reported: Investment, Education, Corruption, 
Openness, and Landlocked; also, an intercept is included.
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TABLE 11. Estimation equations (29) and (30) for US federal subjects, (2SLS)
Dependent 
variable:
Foreign Direct 
Investment
(1)
Mineral-
Share
(2SLS)
(2)
Land
(2SLS)
(3)
Primary 
Share 
(2SLS) 
(4)
Mineral Share 
(2SLS)
(5)
Land
(2SLS)
(6)
Primary
Share 
(2SLS)
(7)
Mineral-
Share
(2SLS)
(8)
Land
(2SLS)
(9)
Primary
Share
(2SLS)
General Tax
23402.04***
(4669.266)
18465**
(7833)
25336.84***
(6116.76)
Infrastructure
5.672***
(0.482)
4.935***
(0.877)
5.555***
(0.509)
Public Goods
5.37***
(0.426)
5.235***
(0.6454)
5.37***
(0.464)
R-squared
n/a n/a n/a 0.6743 0.7403 0.6876 0.7238 0.7383 0.723
N 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
First Stage Results
Dependent 
variable:
Business 
Environment
(1)
General Tax
(2)
General Tax
(3)
General Tax
(4)
Infrastructure
(5)
Infrastructure
(6)
Infrastructure
(7)
Public 
Goods
(8)
Public 
Goods
(9)
Public 
Goods
Mineral Share
5.427***
(1.72)
16692.33**
(6671)
15504**
(6395)
Land 0.314***
(0.097)
571.52***
(178)
602.5***
(162)
Primary Share 6.243***
(1.43)
14758.15**
(6670)
15515**
(7089)
R-squared
0.4406 0.4629 0.4724 0.5090 0.2718 0.2718 0.4991 0.3187 0.3187
N 51 51 51 50 50 50 50 50 50
Note: Standard errors are robust clustered by federal-states. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in parentheses. Superscripts 
correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. The following variables are included in all regressions but not reported: Investment, 
Education, Corruption, Openness, and Landlocked; also, an intercept is included.
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TABLE 12. Estimating Equation (29), replacing 'B' with 'R', for US federal subjects (OLS)
Dependent variable:
Foreign Direct 
Investment
(1) (2) (3)
Mineral Share 
26469.73
(24669.21)
Land
3638.579
(2589.762)
Primary Share 16975.31
(19711.58)
R-squared 0.1418 0.3886 0.1158
N 45 45 45
Note: Standard errors are robust. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in parentheses. Superscripts correspond to a 10, 5 and 
1% level of significance. The following variables are included in all regressions but not reported: Investment, Education, Corruption, 
Openness, and Landlocked; also, an intercept is included.
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TABLE 13. Estimating equation (31) for US federal subjects, Cross-Section 
Share Out of Total GDP Share out of Total Labor
Dependent 
variable: 
Growth of 
Manufacturing 
Sector
(1)
Primary-
Share 
(2)
Mineral-
Share 
(IV)
(3)
Land
(IV)
(4)
Primary-
share 
(5)
Mineral-
Share 
(IV)
(6)
Land
(IV)
Resource-Share
0.142***
(0.043)
0.087**
(0.0402)
0.294***
(0.073)
0.07**
(0.027)
0.011
(0.028)
0.255***
(0.062)
Initial 
Manufacturing-
Share
-0.004
(0.0066)
-0.0063
(0.0046)
0.006
(0.006)
-0.0024
(0.0042)
-0.005
(0.005)
0.008*
(0.0047)
R-squared 0.5445 0.5139 0.3714 0.6162 0.5581 0.4057
N 51 51 51 51 51 51
First Stage Results
Dependent 
variable: 
Primary Share
(2) (3) (5) (6) R-squared N
Mineral  Share
0.726***
(0.1) 0.8956 51
Land
0.023**
(0.009) 0.7282 51
Mineral  Share
0.723***
(0.095) 0.9003 51
Land
0.024**
(0.009) 0.7239 51
Note: Standard errors are robust. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in parentheses. Superscripts correspond to a 10, 5 and 
1% level of significance. The following variables are included in all regressions but not reported: Investment, Education, Corruption, 
Openness, and Landlocked; also, an intercept is included.
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TABLE 14. Estimating equation (31) for US federal subjects, Panel (Fixed Effects) 
Share Out of Total GDP Share out of Total Labor
Dependent 
variable: 
Growth of 
Manufacturing 
Sector
(1)
Primary-
Share 
(2)
Mineral-
Share 
(IV)
(3)
Land
(IV)
(4)
Primary-
share 
(5)
Mineral-
Share 
(IV)
(6)
Land
(IV)
Resource-Share
0.2076***
(0.08)
0.163**
(0.08)
1.12*
(0.6197)
0.0307
(0.039)
-0.0152 
(0.039)
1.93**
(0.867)
Initial 
Manufacturing-
Share
-0.033***
(0.0103)
-0.035***
(0.0096)
0.006
(0.006)
0.0105
(0.006)
0.01
(0.006)
0.025
(0.02)
R-squared 0.2308 0.23 n/a 0.3571 0.3542 n/a
N 357 357 357 357 357 357
First Stage Results
Dependent 
variable: 
Primary Share
(2) (3) (5) (6) R-squared N
Mineral  Share
1.02***
(0.026) 0.9839 357
Land
0.034**
(0.013) 0.9020 357
Mineral  Share
1.04***
(0.023) 0.984 357
Land
0.034***
(0.015) 0.8815 357
Note: Standard errors are robust. Standard deviations for independent variables appear in parentheses. Superscripts correspond to a 10, 5 and 
1% level of significance. The following variables are included in all regressions but not reported: Investment, Education, Corruption, and 
Openness.
